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*P.L. 209 In Hirst v UK (No.2) the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (“the
Court”) held, by a majority of twelve votes to five, that the United Kingdom's blanket ban on convicted
prisoners voting in general and local elections constituted a breach of Art.3 of Protocol 1 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”).1 In so doing it disagreed with the
domestic court which had rejected the claims of three prisoners that the ban constituted a breach of
their Convention rights.2 The case raises serious issues on the question of prisoners'
disenfranchisement.3 More generally, and perhaps more importantly, it raises serious issues
concerning the adjudication of claims under the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”). In particular the
Court suggested that a failure by Parliament to give adequate reasons for its enactments may result
in a finding that those measures violate Convention rights. This approach is at odds with a
foundational principle of the United Kingdom's constitution as expressed in Art.9 of the Bill of Rights
1689 that: “the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be
impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament”.4
This article will set out, very briefly, the background to the ban on prisoner voting and the challenge to
it in the UK and Strasbourg courts. It will then examine the apparent conflict between the approaches
of the Grand Chamber and the House of Lords on the question of the relevance of words spoken in
Parliament to the adjudication of human rights claims. Reference will also be made en passant to the
different approaches adopted by the UK and Strasbourg courts to the vexed question of judicial
deference and the margin of appreciation.
Prisoner disenfranchisement
Section 3(1) of the Representation of the People Act 1983 provides:
“A convicted person during the time that he is detained in a penal institution in pursuance of his
sentence is legally incapable of voting at any parliamentary or local government election.”
*P.L. 210 This section re-enacted the ban imposed by s.4 of the Representation of the People Act
1969 which itself dated back to s.2 of the Forfeiture Act 1870 and before that to the common law
principle that a convicted felon suffered “civic death”.
The prohibition does not apply to those imprisoned for contempt of court5 or those imprisoned for
non-payment of fines.6 The Representation of the People Act 2000 relaxed the provisions by
extending the exclusion from the ban to prisoners on remand or unconvicted mental patients.7 At the
time of the passage of the 2000 Act George Howarth M.P., speaking for the government, stated that it
was “right and appropriate that those … convicted and serving a prison sentence should be deprived
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of the right to vote as part of their punishment”.8
The challenge to the ban on convicted prisoner voting
Article 3 of Protocol 1 ECHR requires that states “undertake to hold free elections at reasonable
intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the
people in the choice of the legislature”. Whilst not apparent on its face, the article has been
interpreted as conferring an individual “right to vote”.9 This right is not absolute: limitations may be
imposed as long as they essentially pursue a legitimate aim and are proportionate.10 The European
Court has held, however, that states are entitled to a wide margin of appreciation in Art.3 of Protocol 1
ECHR cases since there are “numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems and a
wealth of differences … in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe
which it is for each … state to mould into their own democratic vision”.11
Prior to the litigation in Hirst the European Commission on Human Rights had held that prisoner
disenfranchisement in various circumstances did not violate Art.3 of Protocol 1 ECHR. Whilst the right
to vote was considered vital in the Convention's scheme, helping to safeguard the integrity of the
representative democracy considered to be so essential to the protection of human rights, it could be
overridden in individual prisoner voting cases due to the wide margin of appreciation afforded to
states.12
It was against this somewhat unpromising Strasbourg background that three convicted prisoners,
Hirst, Martinez and Pearson, brought their challenge in the English courts seeking a declaration that
s.3(1) of the Representation of the People Act 1983 was incompatible with Art.3 of Protocol 1 ECHR.
*P.L. 211 Kennedy L.J. declined to make a declaration of incompatibility, finding that the ban pursued
a legitimate aim13 and did not constitute a disproportionate interference with Art.3 of Protocol 1 ECHR.
14 In reaching this conclusion he said that “in deference to the legislature courts should not easily be
persuaded to condemn what has been done”.15 The United Kingdom's position on the “broad
spectrum” of approaches among democratic societies was “plainly a matter for Parliament and not the
courts”.16
This decision attracted criticism by academic commentators primarily on the grounds that the court
had been overly deferential to the legislature's decision to impose a complete ban on convicted
prisoner voting.17 As a result of this deference the court only engaged in the most perfunctory analysis
of whether the interference was in pursuit of a legitimate aim and was proportionate.
Hirst v UK (No.2)
Having been refused leave to appeal, Hirst applied to the European Court. The Fourth Chamber of
the Court found that his rights under Art.3 of Protocol 1 ECHR had been violated.18 The government's
request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber was acceded to.
Having reviewed the practice elsewhere in Europe as well as in Canada and South Africa, the Court
took the opportunity to restate and elaborate upon the Art.3 of Protocol 1 ECHR principles outlined
above.19 On the particular facts it went on to consider whether the UK government's stated aims of the
ban--to help prevent crime by “sanctioning the conduct of convicted prisoners” and to “enhanc[e] civic
responsibility and respect for the rule of law”--were legitimate. Whilst hinting at some reservations
about the efficacy of achieving these aims through a ban on voting, the Court accepted that the ban
“may be regarded as advancing these aims” and found “no reason in the circumstances … to exclude
these aims as untenable or per se incompatible with the right guaranteed under [Art.3 of Protocol 1
ECHR]”.20
The Court then went on to consider the proportionality of the ban. Even though it only impacted on
convicted offenders whose criminality was serious enough to warrant a custodial sentence, it still
encompassed a wide range of offenders--from those sentenced to “one day to life” and from
“relatively minor offences” to those of the “utmost gravity”. Even in the case *P.L. 212 of offenders
whose offences were serious enough to warrant an immediate custodial sentence, it was possible
that the sentencing judge would impose a non-custodial sentence that would not deprive the
individual of the vote. Furthermore the domestic courts, in sentencing to custody, made no reference
to disenfranchisement and it was “not apparent, beyond the fact that a court considered it appropriate
to impose a sentence of imprisonment, that there [was] any direct link between the facts of any
individual case and the removal of the right to vote”. Despite these points it is interesting that the
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Court's judgment omits some of the substantive points going to the disproportionality of the measure
that had been relied on by the Chamber.21 Instead the Court subjected the decision-making process
of the domestic authorities to more intense scrutiny in order to assess whether the United Kingdom
had overstepped its margin of appreciation.
First the Court considered the deliberations in Parliament. Emphasis was placed on the fact that:
“[T]here [was] no evidence that Parliament had ever sought to weigh the competing interests or to
assess the proportionality of a blanket ban on the right of a convicted prisoner to vote … it cannot be
said that there was any substantive debate by members of the legislature on the continued
justification in light of modern day penal policy and of current human rights standards for maintaining
such a general restriction on the right of prisoners to vote.”22
With regard to the position adopted by the domestic court the Court noted that it had treated the
matter as one “for Parliament and not for national courts … [it] therefore did not undertake any
assessment of the proportionality of the measure itself “.23
The government's argument24 that there was no European consensus on the question of prisoner
disenfranchisement was held not “of itself to be determinative of the issue”. The margin of
appreciation may be wide, but it was “not all embracing”. Such a general, automatic and
indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important Convention right had to be seen as falling outside any
acceptable margin of appreciation, however wide that margin might be.25
Judicial reference to parliamentary debates
There are clearly problems with a method of human rights adjudication that requires a court to assess
the adequacy of parliamentary debate on an enactment *P.L. 213 and, if that debate is found
wanting, to take this into account in its assessment of the measure's proportionality. These problems
were alluded to by the Court's dissentient minority who commented that if, during the parliamentary
passage of theRepresentation of the People Act 2000, a majority ofM.P.s had disagreed with the
opinion that it was right for convicted prisoners to lose the right to vote, “it would have been open to
them to decide otherwise”. Furthermore, to the majority's observation that there was not any
substantive debate on the matter in Parliament, they said that “it [was] not for the Court to prescribe
the way in which national legislatures carr[ied] out their legislative functions”.26 In their joint concurring
opinions Judges Tulkens and Zagrebelsky expressed serious reservations about the Court taking into
account the adequacy of the legislative debate:
“This is an area in which two sources of legitimacy meet, the Court on the one hand and the national
parliament on the other. This is difficult and slippery terrain for the Court in view of the nature of its
role, especially when it itself accepts that a wide margin of appreciation must be given to the
Contracting States.”27
The terrain becomes yet more treacherous when one transposes this aspect of the judgment to the
United Kingdom as would seem to be required by s.2 HRA.28
Recourse to parliamentary debates has been permitted in English courts in limited circumstances in
order to resolve ambiguities in statutory wording ever since the House of Lords' decision in Pepper
(Inspector of Taxes) v Hart. 29 However the judgment of the Court would seem to require domestic
courts to go far beyond this: to require them to undertake an assessment of the very adequacy of
Parliament's reasoning for its enactments. Where the reasoning does not pass muster, or where there
has been no significant debate at all, this itself may result in the measure being held to be
disproportionate.
The approach of the House of Lords
The question of reference to parliamentary debates for the purposes of assessing the compatibility of
primary legislation was considered by the House of Lords in Wilson v First County Trust Ltd. 30 The
case concerned the compatibility of s.127(3) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 with Convention rights.
In the Court of Appeal Andrew Morritt V.C. had considered that in order to decide whether the issue
was one on which the courts should defer to the “considered *P.L. 214 opinion of the elected body” it
was necessary to “identify the particular issues of social policy which the legislature or the executive
thought it necessary to address, and the thinking which led to that issue being dealt with in the way
that it was”.31 “It was one thing” he continued “to accept the need to defer to an opinion based on
policy [but] quite another … to be required to accept, without question, an opinion for which no reason
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of policy [was] advanced”.32 Upon examination of the material he found that it provided no answer and
“tend[ed] to confuse rather than to illuminate”.33 This absence of a clear policy aim behind the
provision was taken as a factor leading the court to a finding of incompatibility.34
By the time the case came to be considered by the House of Lords this issue had caused so much
concern within Parliament that the Speaker of the House of Commons and the Clerk of the
Parliaments had taken the highly unusual step of seeking to address the Appellate Committee.35 They
argued that there were no circumstances in which it was appropriate for courts to refer to
parliamentary debates so as to enable them to assess the compatibly of legislation.
Their Lordships confirmed that the role of the court had changed under the HRA. It did not now simply
interpret and apply legislation but was required to “evaluate the effect of primary legislation in terms of
Convention rights and where necessary make a declaration of incompatibility”.36 In order to do this it
“had to compare the effect of the legislation with the Convention right”.37 It was necessary to assess
whether the legislation pursued, in Convention terms, a legitimate objective,38 and was proportionate
to the achievement of that objective.39 In order to perform this task it was necessary to assess the
“practical effect” of legislation. Although the need would “seldom arise”40 and “a cautious approach”
was needed41 it might occasionally be necessary to take into account words spoken “by a minister or,
indeed, any other member of either House in the course of a debate on a Bill” as “relevant
background information”.42 In doing this the court would not be “questioning” proceedings in
Parliament or “intruding improperly into the legislative process”. It would “merely be placing itself in a
better position to understand the legislation”.43
*P.L. 215 All this was “constitutionally unexceptionable”. Indeed the courts would be failing in the
new duty assigned to them by Parliament itself if they were to exclude from consideration relevant
background information whose only source was such a statement.44 However their Lordships stressed
that beyond their use as a source of background material, the content of parliamentary debates had
“no direct relevance” in compatibility cases. Lord Nicholls stated emphatically that:
“[I]t is a cardinal constitutional principle that the will of Parliament is expressed in the language used
by it in its enactments. The proportionality of legislation is to be judged on that basis … [it] is not to be
judged by the quality of reasons advanced in support of it in the course of parliamentary debate …
Lack of cogent justification in the course of parliamentary debate is not a matter which ‘counts
against’ the legislation on issues of proportionality. The court is called upon to evaluate the
proportionality of the legislation, not the adequacy of the minister's exploration of the policy options or
of his explanations to Parliament. The latter would contravene article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The court
would then be presuming to evaluate the sufficiency of the legislative process leading up to the
enactment of the statute.”45
The Court of Appeal had, in suggesting that the debate in Parliament had tended “to confuse rather
than illuminate”, crossed the constitutional boundary into the “forbidden territory of questioning
proceedings in Parliament”.46
Thus the view of the House of Lords is that reference may be made to statements in Parliament as
“background information” to ascertain Parliament's policy objective in enacting a particular measure
and as one factor in finding out what it had in mind so as to be able to assess the proportionality and
hence compatibility of the measure. But an absence of any, or any adequate, reasons advanced in
Parliament cannot itself be used as a ground on which to base a finding of incompatibility. For this
would constitute a “questioning” of freedom of speech, debates or proceedings in Parliament contrary
to Art.9 of the Bill of Rights.
Leaving the door ajar--and unforeseen consequences
The views of the Grand Chamber and the unanimous House of Lords on this issue are therefore
diametrically opposed. Indeed the approach of the Grand Chamber in Hirst is a European echo of the
Court of Appeal's approach so roundly rejected by the House of Lords in Wilson. If such methodology
had been adopted by the domestic court in Pearson this would, according to their *P.L. 216
Lordships' reasoning, have been contrary to Art.9 and would have contravened the cardinal principle
that the “proportionality of a statutory measure is to be judged objectively and not by the quality of the
reasons advanced in support of the measure in the course of Parliamentary debate”.47
It may be that the difficulties here are caused, in part, by the international undercurrents to the
European Court's decision in Hirst that made it disinclined to give a stronger, principled judgment on
the substance of prisoner disenfranchisement. It maintained, as it had to given the wide diversity of
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practice across Europe,48 its long held position that states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation when it
comes to the restriction of Art.3 of Protocol 1 ECHR rights.49 Indeed the Court conceded that the UK
government's stated aims of the ban (sanctioning the conduct of convicted prisoners and enhancing
civic responsibility) were legitimate.50 Restrictions on prisoner voting were not in breach of Art.3 of
Protocol 1 ECHR per se. 51 The majority fought shy of utilising principled arguments. Instead they
adopted what at first blush seems like a less far reaching fall-back position; saying that it was
essentially procedural defects in the United Kingdom's ban which took it beyond its margin of
appreciation.52 This procedural adjudicative methodology allowed the Court to leave the door ajar for
states to retain some restrictions on prisoner voting, as long as their legislatures give good reasons
and their courts undertake adequate proportionality analyses of those measures. However the ironic,
and no doubt unforeseen, consequence of this muted procedural approach is that, in trying to limit the
ramifications of its decision, the European Court actually seems to be requiring British courts to
behave in a way which is in conflict with one of the United Kingdom's cardinal constitutional principles.
*P.L. 217 Resolving the conflict?
The extent to which British courts will be bound to adopt the adjudicative methodology of the Grand
Chamber in Hirst would seem to lie in their approach to s.2 HRA.53 Some guidance on the court's role
under s.2 was provided by the House of Lords in Alconbury. Lord Slynn of Hadley stated:
“Although the [HRA] does not provide that a national court is bound by these decisions it is obliged to
take account of them so far as they are relevant. In the absence of some special circumstances it
seems to me that the court should follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the European Court
…”
54
some indication of what might be meant by “special circumstances” was provided by Lord Hoffmann:
“[I]f I thought that … [decisions of the European Court] compelled a conclusion fundamentally at odds
with the distribution of powers under the British constitution, I would have considerable doubt as to
whether they should be followed.”55
These dicta are instructive on the question of the extent to which the European Court's judgment in
Hirst should be used as a template by British courts in their adjudication under the HRA. On the
question of judicial deference to Parliament it is clear that this should not fetter the proportionality
analysis as it was allowed to do in Pearson. This conclusion is perfectly in accord with constitutional
principles; there is no “special circumstance” as to why it ought not to be followed. Indeed it has been
persuasively argued that the court in Pearson, by employing the doctrine of deference at the initial
stages of adjudication, neglected its constitutional responsibility to protect human rights.56 Given that
the right to vote is vital to the effectiveness of that political democracy so central to the scheme of the
Convention it might be questioned whether deference is appropriate at all. 57
However, with regard to the European Court's apparent injunction on domestic courts to assess the
adequacy of Parliament's reasoning for its enactments, it is clear that this would be “fundamentally at
odds with the distribution of powers under the British constitution”.58 Instead the UK courts, free from
the international cross-currents discernible beneath the surface of the Court's judgment, should be
able to undertake proportionality analyses based on the substance and objective impact of legislative
enactments rather than the adequacy of the reasoning behind those measures.
*P.L. 218 Conclusion
These are deep constitutional waters and there is not the space to explore them here. A single
exploratory probe might be launched however. The constitutional settlement reached at the end of the
17th century, of which Art.9 forms part, laid the foundations for the ultimate sovereignty of Parliament.
59 In 1998 Parliament decided to give greater protection to human rights, whilst preserving its
sovereignty.60 It has been argued that theway in which Parliament attempted to achieve this
compromise was through the establishment of a constitutional “dialogue”.61 This may be so, but in any
truly candid dialogue the courts would not be precluded from looking at and assessing the adequacy
of reasons given by the legislature for measures interfering with fundamental rights. The
conversational form introduced by the HRA does not, however, permit such candour; for the courts
themselves, in obeisance to the settlement of 1689 and the principle of sovereignty, have insisted that
Parliament does not have to justify or even explain its actions. A forum for dialogue may have been
created by the HRA in 1998; but it is not one that facilitates a full and frank exchange of views
between Parliament and the courts.
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